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Marathon Mugging - Athens 2004 - Peter Charlish1 
 
This article looks at the case of the Brazilian marathon runner who was 
attacked whilst leading the Athens' 2004 Olympic marathon and poses the 
question of under what circumstances it may be reasonable for the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport to retrospectively alter the results of sports events. 
Special thanks go to Rob Heywood2 for his help and invaluable advice in the 
completion of this article. 
 
The Men’s Marathon at the Athens Olympic Games 2004 was won by Stefano 
Baldini of Italy in a time of 2 hours 10min and 55 seconds. The results also 
show that Mebrahtom Keflezighi of the United States came second in 2 hours 
11 min and 29 seconds and that Vanderlei de Lima of Brazil won the bronze 
medal, clocking 2 hours 12 min 11 seconds. What the record book fails to 
show however is that de Lima had been leading from around the 13 mile mark 
until he was attacked by a protestor less than four miles from the end, (after 
36.5 kilometres), of the race, and that following this attack he was caught and 
passed by both Baldini and Keflezighi. 
 
At the time of the attack, de Lima led Baldini by 28 seconds and an analysis of 
the timings and television pictures provided by the appellant, (de Lima), in the 
later hearing before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, (CAS), suggested that 
had the attack not happened then there were two possible outcomes, (both of 
which were presented as being favourable to de Lima). The first that,3 
“Based on partial times published on the 
IAAF/Athens and Athens 2004 official websites, 
the Appellant was running at a maximum speed of 
a little less than 3 minutes and 2 seconds per 
kilometre between kilometres 30 and 40, where 
the incident occurred. The gold medallist, Stefano 
Baldini was running at 3 minutes per kilometre. …”  
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Baldini therefore was seemingly gaining on de Lima at a rate of two seconds 
per kilometre, meaning that it would have taken around 14 kilometres for 
Baldini to overhaul de Lima. A second analysis, although still favourable to de 
Lima, was somewhat less helpful. It was reported:4 
“A second analysis of the television segment 
showed that it took Stefano Baldini 14 minutes and 
30 seconds to run the distance between the 35th 
and 40th kilometre marks. It took the Appellant, 
running over the same segment, 15 minutes and 8 
seconds, a difference of 29 seconds5. Hence, 
Stefano Baldini was running at a speed of 6 
seconds/kilometre faster for each kilometre than 
the Appellant. The Appellant therefore held that 
had the attack not occurred, the athletes would 
have met at the 41st kilometre”.  
 
However, these times do not tell the whole story since as was further pointed 
out.6 
“In addition to the time the attack wasted, he, (de 
Lima), had to recover his racing rhythm and his 
concentration. He had his energetic system 
blocked by a sudden discharge of adrenalin. … 
The Appellant held that there was an additional 
psychological impact: At the moment of the 
accident, the Appellant was out of sight of the 
racers following him. Due to the attack, Stefano 
Baldini realised that the Appellant was much 
closer than he could have imagined. This 
enhanced his motivation and stimulated his 
determination, and helped him overtake the 
Appellant”. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the race, an appeal was launched by the 
Brazilian team on behalf of de Lima to the competition director. The appeal 
                                            
4
 CAS 2004/A/727 De Lima & BOC v/IAAF at paras 13-14 
5
 A difference seemingly of 38 seconds rather than the reported 29 seconds 
6
 CAS 2004/A/727 De Lima & BOC v/IAAF at paras 15-16 
 3
stated. Just forty five minutes after the appeal had been lodged the result was 
returned. The Jury hearing the appeal stating:7 
“Following an appeal lodged by the Brazilian team 
for obstruction in the Men’s Marathon the Jury 
reviewed the video of the race. They would like to 
express their sympathy towards the athlete and 
regret the unfortunate incident. This shall not 
happen in the future and the security should be 
reinforced for road events. The IAAF is asking the 
Greek authority to identify the responsible person 
and take the appropriate sanctions. The final result 
cannot be changed“. 
 
Following this setback, the Brazilian Athletics Federation launched an appeal 
on behalf of de Lima to the CAS, requesting that an extra gold medal be 
awarded to him.8 The Court however turned down the appeal stating:9 
“Before a CAS Panel will review a  field  of  play  
decision,  there  must  be  evidence,  which  
generally  must  be  direct evidence, of bad faith. If 
viewed in this light, each, of those phrases mean 
there must be  some  evidence  of  preference  for,  
or  prejudice  against,  a  particular  team  or  
Individual”. 
 
Based on these very strict criteria, de Lima’s plight clearly failed to breach 
that standard. His position was therefore hopeless. The Court continued:10 
“The Athlete is requesting to be awarded a gold 
medal. He does not request that such gold medal 
change the results of the race. To award a gold 
medal without changing the results of the race is, 
however beyond, the scope of review of the CAS. 
Had the appealed decision been taken arbitrarily 
or in bad faith, the remedy would not have been a 
change of the announced results, let alone 
awarding a supplementary gold medal without 
changing the results of the race. The only 
available remedy would have been to invalidate 
the race and order it be rerun. There is no 
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regulatory basis upon which the Panel could 
award a medal alongside the medal already won 
by Stefano Baldini”. 
 
Previous case law has firmly established that only in exceptional 
circumstances might the decision of a referee on the field of play be 
disturbed. The referee is in a unique position on the sports field. In Machin v 
Football Association,11 Denning M.R. acknowledged the dangers of the court 
second guessing a decision taken by the referee on the field of play: 
“A referee had a most responsible position…The 
referee was in a most exposed and vulnerable 
position and that had to be borne in mind in any 
subsequent inquiry. For it was really an appeal 
from the referee’s finding”. 
 
The ad hoc division of the CAS following the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games 
went further in expressly stating a preference for the sanctity of a referee’s 
decision. In refusing to review the disqualification, (due to a low punch) of the 
French boxer Christopher Mendy, the CAS stated clearly that such technical 
regulations were purely matters for the appropriate federation12 and further 
that it was the referee who was in the best position to make such 
assessments.13 Their rationale centred on the belief that, “the game must not 
be constantly interrupted by appeals to a judge”.14 In other words, there was a 
concern that such a move to compromise the sanctity of honestly made field 
of play decisions may open the floodgates. 
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The Ad hoc division of the CAS at the Sydney Olympics did however provide 
for the possibility of interference with the decision taken on the field of play. 
Following the women’s single sculls event, the silver medallist15 suggested 
that the photo-finish equipment used to place her in second place was in 
error. The CAS whilst rejecting her claim did however “have jurisdiction to 
determine if equipment is faulty”.16 If such a finding was established then 
presumably the decision taken on the field of play may be reassessed. It has 
also been held that where an International federation’s own rules deny a 
match referee the authority to make a particular decision then the CAS will 
uphold those rules despite opposition from the appropriate governing body.17 
The CAS in this instance reversed a referee’s decision to order a rerun of a 
race after a collision, due to authority to take such a decision being limited to 
the race starter only and not the race referee. As Foster pointed out: 
“…the Court of Arbitration for Sport upheld the 
original result and declared the referee’s decision 
invalid because he had no power under the rules. 
In this particular case, the principle that a sporting 
federation must follow its own rule seems to have 
trumped any principle of autonomy”.18 
 
Thus It can be seen that there are circumstances albeit very limited and 
rigidly controlled circumstances in which a decision taken by the match 
officials may be disturbed. 
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The legality of the decision not to offer de Lima his hoped for remedy, based 
on the existing regulations, therefore seems indisputable. However, a 
question that may be explored, is whether any justification might have been 
identified that would have enabled the Court to bow to the request of the 
Brazilian Federation and award de Lima a second gold medal effectively 
altering the final result of the event retrospectively . 
 
There is some limited precedent for a humanitarian approach in dealing with 
de Lima and a wider remit than cited above, where results in a sport may 
stand if for instance the event is abandoned once a particular period of time 
has passed. In association football this may occur if there is a crowd invasion 
of the playing arena. For example Rule 30.2 of the Football League states:19 
“Duration of Matches. All League Matches shall 
be of 90 minutes’ duration but any League Match 
which from any cause whatever falls short of 90 
minutes’ duration may be ordered to count as a 
completed fixture or be replayed in full or in part 
on whatever terms and conditions the Executive 
shall in their absolute discretion determine and 
shall be played in compliance with these 
Regulations  and the Football Association Rules 
respectively and under the Laws of the Game as 
approved by the International Football Association 
Board. In the event of conflict between any such 
Rules, Regulations and Laws as aforesaid, the 
Football Association Rules shall prevail”. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
Clearly an analogy can be identified with the situation which occurred during 
the Olympic marathon in Athens. De Lima was attacked by a spectator, 
(Cornelius Horan), who invaded the marathon course. His action had far more 
serious consequences for the participant than is normally the case with 
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football crowd invasions, which rarely lead to confrontations between players 
and spectators. It can be argued that de Lima’s incident was tantamount to 
just such a crowd invasion and that in this scenario the governing body, (at 
least in association football), has the discretion to order the result to stand at 
the point of the invasion, or less practicably to order a rerun of the entire 
event. Of course the International Olympic Committee did all that they were 
legally required to do, in that they considered the matter and at their 
discretion dismissed the appeal from the Brazilian and in pursuing that action 
acted without prejudice in the exercise of their discretion, therefore 
demonstrating clear procedural fairness and upholding the principles of 
natural justice. Lord Denning M.R., commenting on the importance of 
procedural fairness in the case Enderby v Football Association, which 
concerned the right to legal representation at a tribunal investigating the 
award of training licences run by the Jockey Club in the United Kingdom, 
stated:20 
“It is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal. 
They are masters of their own procedure: and, if 
they, in the proper exercise of their discretion, 
decline to allow legal representation, the courts 
will not interfere. … But I would emphasise that 
the discretion must be properly exercised. The 
tribunal must not fetter its discretion by rigid 
bonds. A domestic tribunal is not at liberty to 
lay down an absolute rule”. (Emphasis added) 
 
Lord Denning M.R., was thus emphasising the need for flexibility in the rules 
laid down by governing bodies and that as long as there is such flexibility then 
the members of the associations and governing bodies will be bound by these 
rules. A fundamental principle of natural justice is the right to a fair hearing, 
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and a rule against bias,21 and it can be seen that the IOC, (as found by the 
CAS), observed these principles. The CAS in finding against de Lima,22 
stated simply: 
“There is no evidence of prejudice against the 
Appellant, (de Lima) or preference for the athlete 
who was awarded the gold medal. There are 
therefore no grounds permitting the Panel to 
review the decision of the Jury of Appeal. The 
Appellant has not established that the decision of 
the Jury of Appeal was tainted by bad faith or 
arbitrariness”. 
 
The law upon which the Panel decision was made was based on the decision 
in Segura v/IAAF.23 The rationale behind supporting the decisions of officials 
being stated simply: 
“CAS arbitrators do not review the determinations 
made on the playing field by judges, referees, 
umpires, or other officials who are charged with 
applying what are sometimes called ‘rules of the 
game’...[T]hey are not, unlike on-field judges, 
selected for their expertise in officiating the 
particular sport”.24 
 
Commenting on the Segura decision, the de Lima panel citing The Korean 
Olympic Committee v International Skating Committee,25 explained: 
“The best example of such preference or prejudice 
was referred to by the Panel in Segura, where 
they stated that one circumstance where the CAS 
Panel could review a field of play decision would 
be if a decision were made in bad faith, e.g. as a 
consequence of corruption (see Para, 17). The 
Panel accepts that this places a high hurdle that 
must be cleared by any Applicant seeking to 
review a field of play decision. However, if the 
hurdle were to be lower, the flood-gates would be 
opened and any dissatisfied participant would be 
able to seek the review of a field of play decision”. 
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With no corruption or bad faith apparent, de Lima was left without remedy.  
Whilst the hands of the CAS were therefore tied in being unable to offer de 
Lima remedy based on Segura, it may be interesting to examine the question 
from a different perspective, by identifying, (as the rules of association football 
allow), the extent to which appeals panels or ultimately the CAS may 
theoretically at least have a discretion, or might be empowered to 
retrospectively alter the results of sporting events due to varying 
circumstances, such as those presented by de Lima.  
 
The question that must be addressed is therefore what might those "varying 
circumstances" amount to? It is submitted that if it can be said with 
reasonable certainty that but for the incident in question an appellant would 
not have been significantly disadvantaged to the extent that they have been 
denied position in an event then where such unreasonable disadvantage has 
occurred, it may be seen as equitable for the CAS or relevant appeals body to 
authorise a departure from the Segura criteria and retrospectively interfere 
with the match result. One example may be where there has been a clear 
error made by a judge(s) in scoring which has had a direct impact on the 




Precedent has been set with regards to drug abuse cases. Athletes found 
guilty of doping offences are routinely disqualified from an event under 
authority from WADA code article 9,26 the code commenting that: 
“When an athlete wins a gold medal with a 
prohibited substance in his or her system, that is 
unfair to other athletes in that Competition 
regardless of whether the gold medallist was at 
fault in any way. Only a ‘clean’ athlete should be 
allowed to benefit from his or her competitive 
results”. 
 
The end result of any such drug influenced result being that the guilty athlete 
would forfeit their position, being replaced by the next “clean” athlete. The 
WADA code continues: 
“An anti-doping rule violation occurring during or in 
connection with an Event may, upon the decision 
of the ruling body of the Event lead to 
disqualification of all the athlete’s individual results 
obtained in that Event with all consequences, 
including forfeiture of all medals, points and 
prizes”.27 
 
Thus, if an athlete gains an unfair advantage through the use of performance 
enhancing drugs then remedy for a “cheated” athlete is clear. However de 
Lima has been as surely cheated as any sports participant who loses to an 
athlete who has taken performance enhancing drugs and yet he is left without 
remedy. Baldini clearly gained an unfair advantage, (although through no fault 
of his own), and yet, de Lima is left without remedy unlike a less overtly 
disadvantaged victim of doping violations, (unwittingly or otherwise), who may 
have lost a medal opportunity due to such a doping violation by another 
competitor. Interestingly the CAS opined in 1998: 
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“It would indeed be shocking to include in a 
ranking an athlete who had not competed using 
the same means as his opponents, for whatever 
reasons”.28 (Emphasis added) 
 
Clearly de Lima competed in different circumstances to all other participants 
in the Olympic marathon. All other competitors received an unfair advantage, 
(albeit from their perspective a blameless advantage), over de Lima due to 
the actions of Cornelius Horan. More specifically and relevantly, Stefano 
Baldini and the eventual silver medal winner Mebrahtom Keflezighi benefited 
from this unfair advantage and yet this scenario apparently does not fall within 
the definition of for whatever reasons cited above.  
 
If we examine the WADA code rationale for the application of the principle of 
strict liability to issues of doping control, we can identify one of the most 
coherent arguments against allowing the appeal from de Lima to succeed. 
The code cites Quigley v UIT: 
“The vicissitudes of competition, like those of life 
generally may create many types of unfairness, 
whether by accident or the negligence of 
unaccountable Persons which the law cannot 
repair. Furthermore it appears to be a laudable 
policy objective not to repair an accidental 
unfairness to an individual by creating an 
intentional unfairness to the whole body of other 
competitors. ".29 
 
That the attack on de Lima was unfair is indisputable. Further, it may well be 
looked upon as one of the vicissitudes of competition, in much the same way 
as a refereeing error for example and therefore in that respect, it is something 
that legal recourse may have difficulty in remedying. The comment above 
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related to the rationale behind strict liability and particularly to banning an 
"innocent" athlete who has ingested a substance unknowingly. To allow them 
to retain their position would create injustice on the rest of the field. They 
would be competing at an advantage having taken, (unknowingly), a 
performance enhancing substance. This is not necessarily the case with de 
Lima. He was not requesting the retention of position gained advantageously, 
rather he was requesting the return of a position he had rightfully gained but 
had been taken away from him due in part at least to the negligence of the 
organisers who had arguably failed to police the event adequately. Rather 
than being bound by the Segura criteria, might it not have been preferable for 
the CAS to examine the evidence presented concerning the relevant timings 
of the athletes and then base their decision on this evidence rather than 
sheltering behind the Segura criteria? 
 
If we turn to examine alternative cases that have come before the CAS which 
may fall within the definitions provided above by Article 9 of the WADA code 
and Wei v Fina, then a better understanding of the practicalities of the 
retrospective alteration of event results may be gained. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of such a case involved the Scottish skier 
Alain Baxter who tested positive for methamphetamine30 subsequent to the 
men’s slalom competition on 23rd February 2002 at the Salt Lake City Winter 
Olympics, where he won a bronze medal. Following his positive test, Baxter 
was banned and stripped of his bronze medal which was then awarded to the 
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original fourth place finisher.31 Baxter appealed unsuccessfully to the CAS 
against his ban. The circumstances behind Baxter’s failed test, (which were 
entirely accepted by the arbitration panel), are a salient lesson to all athletes. 
The panel reported: 
“Mr. Baxter has a well-documented long-standing 
medical condition of nasal congestion. He has 
used a non-prescription Vicks Vapor Inhaler for 
the purpose of relieving nasal congestion as 
needed over many years.  The Vicks inhaler is 
included in the list of permitted substances issued 
by the United Kingdom Sports Council. The Vicks 
inhaler sold over the counter in the United States 
has a different formulation than the one sold in the 
United Kingdom.  The U.S. version of the inhaler 
contains ‘levmetamfetamine’”.32 
(leymetamfetamine being the amphetamine on the 
banned list) 
 
It was accepted that Baxter neither sought nor gained any competitive 
advantage due to the presence of this amphetamine in his urine sample.33 
The report goes on: 
“The level of substance found in his body is 
consistent with his taking the medication for 
therapeutic use. … Whether or not Mr. Baxter 
should have been more careful before taking the 
medication -- by reading the label showing the 
presence of levmetamfetamine in the product or 
by consulting with the team doctor before taking 
the medication -- is irrelevant to our decision.  
Consistent CAS case law has held that athletes 
are strictly responsible for substances they place 
in their body and that for purposes of 
disqualification (as opposed to suspension), 
neither intent nor negligence needs to be proven 
by the sanctioning body”.34 
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It was therefore held that irrespective of fault the panel had no option but to 
confirm Baxter’s disqualification.35 Despite his apparent “innocence” in this 
violation, the panel also rejected Baxter’s submission that his disqualification 
was a disproportionate sanction compared to the severity of the violation. The 
Panel concluded: 
“Disqualification is the minimum sanction that 
automatically follows a doping offence, in 
accordance with Article 3.3 of the OMAC.  As 
noted above, the disqualification of an athlete for 
the presence of a prohibited substance, whether 
or not the ingestion of that substance was 
intentional or negligent and whether or not the 
substance in fact had any competitive effect, has 
routinely been upheld by CAS panels. It is 
reasonable for the IOC to have determined that it 
may not always be possible to prove or disprove 
fault or performance-enhancing effect, but that in 
order to ensure the integrity of results the mere 
presence of a prohibited substance requires 
disqualification. Disqualification is the minimum 
sanction that automatically follows a doping 
offence”36 
 
Interestingly, the Panel did address the notion of fairness and whether 
Baxter’s disqualification violated what they termed “every principle of fairness 
in sport”.37 Unfortunately for Baxter, the sledgehammer approach of strict 
liability brooked no argument. Whilst of course it would be unjustifiable to 
disqualify all those who gained an unfair advantage over de Lima in the 
Athens’ marathon, the notion of fairness and morality in such extreme 
circumstances arguably deserved a more sympathetic hearing. 
 
It is established practice on the part of the CAS, that where a sanction 
imposed by an International Governing Body on a sports participant for a 
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doping offence for example is too harsh, where the athlete concerned has 
demonstrated no significant fault or negligence in the resultant positive dope 
test, then the CAS may act to mitigate this sanction under the principle of 
proportionality.38 It is on this basis that exceptional circumstances exists in the 
WADA code. It has been accepted that the very basis of doping regulation, 
the principle of strict liability, is an unforgiving tool that at times can clearly 
produce inequitable results and that therefore the clearest way to counteract 
these harsh realities is to allow the athletes some limited leeway under the 
WADA Code,39 and furthermore where exceptional circumstances have 
dictated that a sanction has been eliminated completely then the athlete may 
have the “failed” test eliminated from their record.40 It has been clearly 
established therefore that fairness and equity have a central role to play in the 
sanctioning of athletes in doping control matters and therefore it may be 
suggested that the adoption of such principles may be pursued where a clear 
and obvious injustice has been suffered by an athlete through no fault of their 
own as in the case of Vanderlei de Lima, Yang Tae Young and others cited in 
this note. The problem of course arises due to the complexity and uncertain 
nature of the eventual outcome of the relevant events from which such 
injustices arose. It cannot be said for instance with complete certainty 
whether de Lima would have finished ahead of Baldini but for Cornelius’s 
Horan’s unfortunate intervention in Athens in 2004. However, where 
circumstances demonstrably show with reasonable certainty what the 
outcome of the event would have been then similar provision might apply 
enabling the CAS to retrospectively alter the result of events. Such a 
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provision could go beyond the current restrictive Segura criteria,41 and place 
greater priority on fairness and equity rather than the current predilection 
towards purely harsh justice in allowing remedy only were bad faith or 
corruption has been identified. The difficulty arises of course in identifying 
when such reasonable certainty has occurred. 
 
An analogous case emerged from the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, in the 
pairs figure-skating. In the event, Elena Berezhnaya, and Anton Sikharulidze 
from Russia and the Canadian couple of Jamie Sale and David Pelletier were 
initially awarded the gold and silver medals respectively, with the Russian pair 
winning by the smallest of margins. However, it then emerged that one of the 
judges, Marie-Reine Le Gougne of France had apparently been pressurised 
to favour the Russian pair in her voting. This of course granted a clear and 
unequivocal advantage to the Russians at the expense of the Canadians. In 
an act of sound commonsense, the IOC authorised a second gold medal, 
following “a late night deal in a hotel suite”,42 to be awarded to the unfortunate 
Canadian couple, therefore achieving at a stroke justice for them whilst 
avoiding penalising the blameless Russian couple. This situation, (unlike that 
involving Vanderlei de Lima), fitted squarely within the Segura43criteria, 
displaying very obvious evidence of unfairness and bad faith. It is however 
the case that if we examine this position from the perspective of the end result 
rather than the journey taken to reach that end result then the two examples 
bear similar hallmarks. Both the Canadians and de Lima were denied the gold 
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medal, (or at least the chance of a gold medal), by external factors for which 
no competitor was culpable. It is therefore arguably justifiable that de Lima 
should have been treated in the same manner as the Canadians. However, 
whilst it is the case that both ice-skating pairs had finished their routines by 
the time the interference occurred, (the Canadian couple skated first) the 
same cannot be said for de Lima. His event had yet to reach its conclusion 
when Horan attacked him, and therefore there was a level of uncertainty as to 
his true result that was not present with the ice-skaters. One only has to 
examine the case of Jim Peter’s at the 1954 Vancouver Commonwealth 
Games to understand this kind of uncertainty.44 Rather pertinently Jacques 
Rogge, President of the IOC, said in the aftermath of the ice-skating scandal, 
“We (the IOC), took a position that is one of justice and fairness for the 
athletes”.45.Whilst being commendable in this situation, de Lima may wonder 
where fairness resides in his position. 
 
There have been similar occasions when competitors have benefited from a 
decision to retrospectively alter the results of an Olympic event in the interests 
of fairness and morality. For example, in the 1924 Winter Olympics in 
Chamonix, Anders Haugen, then 23 placed fourth in the ski-jumping 
competition. He was awarded his rightful bronze medal fifty years later when 
an historian discovered an error in judging. The unfortunate original bronze 
medal winner Thorlief Haug was posthumously demoted to fourth place, (he 
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had been dead for forty years).46 There had however been no suggestion of 
corruption, prejudice or bad faith, merely an error, in other words, this 
particular case failed to fit within the Segura criteria47 cited as being crucial in 
the decision to reject de Lima’s appeal. 
 
It must be remembered that de Lima was arguing not for the promotion of one 
athlete at the expense of another, (as occurred with Haugen and Haug), but 
rather he was requesting the award of a second gold medal, effectively to 
create two first place athletes, crucially different therefore from the incident 
cited above. The essence of sport is surely its competitive nature, and unless 
there is a dead heat, then it is suggested that central to this essence is the 
notion of there being one winner, one champion and if this is the case then 
the argument presented by de Lima runs into difficulties. However, his 
suggested remedy is not without recent precedent. Mackay explains: 
“In 1993 the IOC awarded a second gold medal in 
synchronised swimming from the previous year's 
Barcelona games to another Canadian athlete, 
Sylvie Frechette. She had been placed second 
because a Brazilian judge mistyped her score, 
awarding only 8.7. The intended 9.7 would have 
given Frechette the gold”.48 
More importantly for de Lima however, as MacKay continues, “The IOC's 
decision did not affect the original winner Kristen Babb-Sprague of the United 
States, who surprisingly kept her medal”.49 The record books therefore show 
that for the synchronised swimming competition at the Barcelona Olympics, 
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we had two gold medallists, despite the fact that their scores were not tied. It 
is once again difficult to see how this particular case can fit within the Segura 
criteria which apparently blocked de Lima’s appeal. A clear and very definite 
mistake by an official does not display prejudice and raises the possibility of 
other appeals where officials have made such clear errors. Similarly in the 
1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, third place in the Women’s 100-metres 
hurdles initially was declared a dead heat between American Kim Turner and 
France's Michele Chardonnet. However, officials then decided that the 
American was ahead at the finish and awarded her the bronze medal. 
Subsequently, the IOC re-examined the tapes of the finish, and as a result 
Chardonnet received a second bronze medal 3½ months after the games had 
finished. 
 
Finding his path to justice blocked by the IOC and the CAS, might de Lima 
find remedy elsewhere? Once again there is some precedent, this time from 
the world of trampolining: 
“At the 2001 Trampoline World Championship, 
Irina Karavaeva (Russia) was awarded the gold 
medal. Later, she realised that a clear error had 
been made in the judging and that another athlete 
should have won 'her' gold medal. One month 
later, Irina Karavaeva made this statement: ‘I very 
much regret the mistake of the judges at the World 
Championship in Denmark. I consider that it is 
necessary to correct this mistake and I (have) 
decided to give the gold medal to my friend Anna 
Dogonadze from Germany in the spirit of 
friendship and fair play.’ - Irina Karavaeva (2001) 
According to the rules of the International 
Gymnastics Federation (FIG), the official results 
cannot be changed after the medals have been 
awarded. But FIG President and IOC member, 
Bruno Grandi, decided to make an exception to 
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this rule and to correct the judging error. The 
official results were changed. Anna Dogonadze 
(Germany) was awarded the gold medal, and Irina 
Karavaeva (Russia) was awarded the silver 
medal”.50 
 
It is though asking much of Baldini in particular to forfeit his own gold medal 
unilaterally, particularly as crucially unlike in the other examples cited the 
event had not finished when the injustice occurred and the final result of the 
event therefore remained in doubt. Perhaps more relevant to de Lima’s case 
was the decision of the FIG to break their own rules and alter the official 
results after the medals had been awarded. 
 
Within any law making body there must be scope for the exercise of 
discretion.  Undoubtedly desirable characteristics of the law are certainty and 
consistency; these are the foundations upon which justice is often achieved.  
Thus, the principle of stare decisis remains the fundamental cornerstone of 
the common law underpinning its development on an incremental basis 
through the doctrine of judicial precedent.  As Denning states,   'the law 
develops by the application of old principles to new circumstances. Therein 
lies its genius”.51  He continues to suggest that often the law is viewed as 
nothing more than the blind application of established rules to developing 
circumstances.  Indeed the perception is often 'with the law as it is, not what it 
ought to be...the rule is the thing.  Right or wrong does not matter.'52 
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Nonetheless strict adherence to established principles does not always 
achieve its intended purpose, justice.  In some situations refusing to deviate 
from the script creates anomalies within the law.  The law must be certain and 
consistent, but it must also be flexible and capable of adapting.  As Denning 
once suggested:  
'If lawyers hold to their precedents too closely, 
forgetful of the fundamental principles of truth 
and justice which they should serve, they may 
find the whole edifice comes tumbling down 
about them”.53 
 
There have been occasional examples of late where the courts have been 
willing to depart from established legal principles in order to give true effect to 
the right the law is trying to protect.  For example, in a medical context the 
courts seem to have manipulated the legal rules relating to negligent 
information disclosure in order to adequately protect the patient's right of 
autonomy.  In the recent case of Chester v Afshar54 the House of Lord's 
modified the stringent rules of causation to allow the claimant to recover 
damages for an injury she suffered as a result of the surgeon's negligent 
failure to disclose certain risks.  The crux of this decision seems to be based 
on policy considerations regarding justice and fairness taking precedence 
over traditional legal principles in order to reach a fair outcome.55  This is 
exemplified by Lord Steyn who stated: 
“ …I am glad to have arrived at the conclusion 
that the patient is entitled in law to succeed. 
This result is in accord with one of the most 
basic aspirations of the law, namely to right 
wrongs. Moreover, the decision announced by 
the House today reflects the reasonable 
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expectations of the public in contemporary 
society”.56 
 
In the earlier Australian case of Chappel v Hart57, Professor Honore', 
commenting on the court's ability to manipulate legal rules, suggests: 
“Dr Chappel violated Mrs Hart's right to chose 
for herself, even if he did not increase the risk 
to her. Judges should vindicate rights that have 
been violated if they can do so consistently…Dr 
Chappel did cause the harm that Mrs Hart 
suffered, though not by the advice he failed to 
give her…Morally he was responsible for the 
outcome of what he did…Do the courts have 
power in certain cases to override causal 
considerations in order to vindicate a plaintiff's 
rights? I believe they do though the right must 
be exercised with great caution”.58 
 
Accordingly it seems the civil courts do have the capacity to deviate from 
traditional legal rules, but this right has to be exercised carefully.   
How then does this relate to the sporting world and to what extent can the 
Court of Arbitration for sport be likened to the normal courts? Clearly, and to 
operate effectively, the CAS must have some scope to deviate from its 
established rules and practices.  However, it must be stressed that whilst 
these powers ought to exist, they must be used sparingly and only invoked 
under the rarest of circumstances.  Any variation must be the exception rather 
than the rule and any departure from established practice demands strong 
justification and reason for doing so.  Thus, in relation to information 
disclosure, the civil courts clearly view autonomy as a right that is worthy of 
proper protection and seem willing to be flexible in their application of legal 
rules to achieve this.  In contrast, the civil courts seem reluctant for example 
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to substitute the ordinary standard of care in negligence with a standard of 
reckless disregard for injuries that happen in sporting contests.59  The 
perception therefore must be that the reasons for implementing a variable 
standard of care are not strong enough to justify any departure from 
established legal principles.60 
 
It is submitted that the Court of Arbitration for Sport must be prepared, on 
some occasions, to handle their decision making with a certain amount of 
flexibility.  This promotes fairness and natural justice and ensures these 
important principles do not fall by the way side at the hands of certainty and 
consistency.  The objective of both approaches is to achieve justice, yet this is 
not possible if either is applied too rigidly or haphazardly.  In any event the 
two approaches need not be viewed as diametrically opposed.  They can 
complement each other.  Thus, all that is needed is a clear and identifiable 
criterion as to where the CAS may be entitled to exercise a degree of 
pragmatism in its sporting judgments.  This ought not to be too vague, yet in 
the same breath should not be too precise so as to render it meaningless by 
limiting the discretion which it is supposed to provide.  A classic example 
would be in the de Lima case61 itself.  Here it is clearly not enough to say the 
CAS can invoke discretion under “varying circumstances”.  The circumstances 
in the de Lima case would not be strong enough to justify any departure from 
existing rules. There were too many external facts which may have influenced 
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the final result.  However, in contrast, the case involving the Canadian 
synchronised swimmer cited elsewhere in this note would constitute a 
situation where some flexibility is needed where, but for the error of a judge, 
the outcome was certain and the athlete was denied a gold medal as a result 
of a mistake.  Here it is quite correct that the CAS should be able to award a 
second gold medal retrospectively. 
 
A similarly relevant case, which demanded retrospective action arose 
following the Athens Olympics in 2004. In the disputed action, the American 
gymnast Paul Hamm was awarded the overall men’s gold medal with Yang 
Tae Young of Korea being awarded the bronze medal. However, Young had 
been erroneously docked 0.100 from the start value of his routine for the 
parallel bars. This points value making the difference between first place and 
third place. Despite suspending three judges in the wake of the debacle, the 
FIG initially suggested that they were not able to alter the result of the 
competition. However, in a move seemingly designed to reclaim the moral 
high ground and to right a very obvious wrong, the President of the FIG wrote 
to Hamm, via the United States Olympic Committee, (USOC) suggesting that 
he may return his gold medal to Young. The letter stated: 
“This act,62 which demonstrates the highest level 
of honesty, places you amongst the true Olympic 
champions. I wish to confirm that your words grant 
you the highest esteem from the worldwide 
gymnastics family…I wish to remind you that the 
FIG Executive Committee has admitted the error 
of judgement made on the Parallel Bars and 
suspended the three responsible judges … As a 
result, the true winner of the All-Around 
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competition is Yang Tae Young. If, (according to 
you (sic) declarations to the press), you would 
return your medal to the Korean if the FIG 
requested it, then such an action would be 
recognised as the ultimate demonstration of Fair-
play by the whole world. The FIG and the IOC 
would highly appreciate the magnitude of this 
gesture. At this moment in time, you are the only 
one who can make this decision”.63 
 
That this letter met with a hostile response from the USOC is an 
understatement. In a tersely worded statement, they replied: 
“The USOC views this letter as a blatant and 
inappropriate attempt on the part of FIG to once 
again shift responsibility for its own mistakes and 
instead pressure Mr. Hamm into resolving what 
has become an embarrassing situation for the 
Federation. The USOC finds this request to be 
improper, outrageous and so far beyond the 
bounds of what is acceptable that it refuses to 
transmit the letter to Mr. Hamm…. It is the opinion 
of the USOC that Mr. Hamm did exactly what an 
Olympic champion should do: he performed to the 
best of his ability, he competed within the rules of 
his sport, and he accepted his gold medal with 
pride, honor and dignity”.64 
 
The USOC concluded by stating "As stewards of the Olympic movement, we 
all share a responsibility to protect, not sacrifice, the interests of athletes”.65 
What is immediately obvious from this aggressive response is the inability of 
the USOC to see the wider picture. At all times their only interest is in their 
athlete. The recognition of their position as stewards of the movement is 
particularly stark – this being the case, their loyalty should be placed with the 
movement itself rather than with the individual athletes and central to the well 
being of the Olympic movement is the principle of fairness to all. This principle 
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was so readily identified by Irina Karavaeva but not apparently by Hamm nor 
the USOC. 
 
The stance taken by the Americans meant that Young’s only chance of 
gaining his rightful reward was by appealing to the CAS. This appeal was duly 
heard on 27th September 2004. Unfortunately the CAS ruled against Young, 
suggesting that his appeal to the FIG had not been lodged in time. They 
stated: 
“We consider that this sufficiently identifies that 
any appeal must be dealt with during, not after a 
competition. After a competition, the person/body  
is effectively functus officio. This interpretation  
conforms with the natural expectation of both  
participants, spectators and the public at large that 
at the close of a competition in any sport, 
gymnastics included, the identity of the winner 
should be known, and not subject  to  alteration  
thereafter save where exceptionally, for example,  
the purported winner is proved to have failed a 
drug test and so been disqualified”.66 
 
Furthermore, the error was explained as an error of interpretation concerning 
the technical regulation on the part of the judge67 and as such any sanction 
would be applied against the judge rather than a reversal of the still clearly 
erroneous result. With respect this appears to be an unjust and inequitable 
perspective. Essentially there is an acknowledged error which has produced 
an erroneous result and yet technicalities are being allowed to stand in the 
way of equity. The CAS suggest that allowing the erroneous result to stand 
would serve to solidify the authority of referees and umpires. They continued: 
“It68 would contribute to finality. It would uphold, 
critically, the authority of the umpire, judge or 
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referee, whose power to control competition, 
already eroded by the growing use of technology 
such as video replays, would be fatally 
undermined if every decision taken could be 
judicially reviewed. And, to the extent that the 
matter is capable of analysis in conventional legal 
terms, it could rest on the premise that any 
contract that the player has made in entering into 
a competition is that he or she should have the 
benefit of honest “field of play” decisions, not 
necessarily correct ones”.69 
 
The CAS in this instance has allowed an unjust result to stand. They have 
thrown equity and fairness out of the window. This was not a matter of 
judgment or opinion, it was a very clear and definite error. It is not a decision 
which might have opened the floodgates, neither is it a decision which would 
have adversely affected the authority of referees and umpires on the field of 
play. This merely compromises the integrity and good name of the 
appropriate governing body and the CAS itself. 
 
The CAS in a final abdication of fair play and justice commented: 
“While in this instance we are being asked, not to 
second guess an official but rather to consider the 
consequences of an admitted error by an official 
so that the ‘field of play’ jurisprudence is not 
directly engaged, we consider that we should  
nonetheless  abstain  from  correcting  the  results  
by  reliance  of  an admitted error.  An error 
identified with the benefit of hindsight, whether 
admitted or not, cannot be a ground for reversing 
a result of a competition … So it needs to be 
clearly stated that while the error may have cost 
Yang a gold medal, it did not necessarily do so”.70 
 
The final justification for refusing remedy is presented as the uncertainty 
engendered by the erroneous scoring. The incident occurred with one rotation 
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still to come and of course if the Korean gymnast had been granted the 
correct score then this may have impacted the performance of the athletes in 
the final rotation.71 This argument of course is particularly strong when 
considering the case of Vanderlei de Lima and was so graphically illustrated 
as suggested earlier in the 1954 Commonwealth Games marathon when Jim 
Peters collapsed. It is a strong reason for upholding field of play decisions, 
but it should not necessarily override moral concerns of fairness and equity. It 
is submitted that in this situation, the award of a second gold medal would 
refrain from penalising the entirely blameless first place finisher but would 
provide an equitable remedy for the unfortunate victim of erroneous judging. 
The Segura criteria72 currently provide severe restrictions for any competitor 
hoping to review a decision taken on the field of play. What is apparent is that 
the application of the appropriate rules appears to be afflicted by varying 
inconsistencies. Furthermore, the end product of these inconsistencies 
appears at times to result in equity and justice, as seen for instance in the 
case of the Canadian and Russian ice-skaters but at other times produces 
palpably unfair results as seen in the case of Yang Tae Young. Part of the 
problem of course lies in the fact that most examples are not so black and 
white. The reality in de Lima’s case for instance is that there were simply too 
many variables to be certain that he would have retained his lead over Baldini 
and any decision must be based on equity and fairness and certainly not 
based solely on whether we feel sympathy for the unfortunate athlete or not. It 
is submitted however that a less severe approach might at times be 
appropriate., in that where there is an error in law, (not an error of opinion or 
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judgment), or a misapplication of the rules, then where this has very clearly 
affected the result of the competition, the adjudicating body or more 
exceptionally the CAS may at their discretion and on a case by case basis, 
seek a remedy based on fairness and equity.  
 
Ultimately of course, de Lima’s appeal failed. Although being full of sympathy 
for the Brazilian, the CAS Panel refused to find remedy for him. In conclusion, 
they stated:73 
“The circumstances surrounding this event are 
extremely unfortunate. In hindsight, one can only 
regret that stricter security measures were not 
taken to avoid the mishap which befell him. The 
Appellant must however draw solace from the fact 
that he was not only awarded one of the highest 
distinction possible within the Olympic movement, 
the Pierre de Coubertin medal, but the 
sportsmanship and dignity with which he faced 
these unfortunate events will be remembered in 
Olympic lore as one of the true demonstrations of 
what the Olympic spirit is ultimately all about. 
History will have a brighter and more appreciative 
memory of such athletic feats and moral character 
over that of the result of the particular race”. 
 
The comforting words of the Panel at the conclusion of their decision, with 
respect provide scant consolation to de Lima. Due to the inability of the CAS 
to look beyond Segura, an opportunity has been missed to reclaim some of 
the morality for track and field that has been lost in the wake of the damage 
that recent scandals such as Balco have done to the public image of the 
sport. It was a chance to take a moral lead and seek the compassionate 
remedy rather than the strictly legalistic one. Rather than awarding the almost 
meaningless Baron Pierre de Coubertin award for fairplay, the IOC might 
instead have shown compassion and considered authorising the award of a 
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second gold medal to de Lima. This would not have resulted in a reckless 
expansion of the Segura criteria nor it is submitted would it have caused the 
floodgates to open. Rather it would have edged the sporting world, if only for 
a few moments, back to the lost Corinthian values of yesteryear. 
 
 
 
